

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-10

SAM-01 SAJ-01 ACDA-05 AID-05 OMB-01 /082 W

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R 121429Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0228

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LISBON

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AMEMBASSY PARIS

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AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 3351

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT PFOR PO NO

SUBJ: SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC MEETING IN STOCKHOLM

REFS: (A) STATE 188416 (B) COPENHAGEN 2266 (C) STOCKHOLM 2804

SUMMARY: NORWEGIAN LABOR PARTY CHAIRMAN REIULF STEEN, WHO IS
PREOCCUPIED WITH THE UPCOMING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, AGREED TO
SEE ME BRIEFLY ON AUGUST 11. MY MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO DIS-
CUSS THE STOCKHOLM SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC MEETING WHICH STEEN
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ATTENDED FOR NORWAY ALONG WITH PRIME MINISTER TRYGVE BRATTELI.

STEEN FOUND SOARES LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN HE HAD ANTICIPATED FROM NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS, BUT STILL PAINTING A DARK PICTURE OF THE FUTURE, PARTICULARLY WHEN HE MET ALONE WITH STEEN FOR TWO HOURS. SOARES CONSIDERED THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN EUROPE, NOTABLY THE SOVIETS HELD THE KEY TO PORTUGAL'S FUTURE, AND PRESSURE UPON THEM WAS CORRESPONDINGLY VITAL. HE SAW THE REMOVAL OF CONCALVES AND CURRENT HE REPRESENTS AS KEY TO RESOLUTION OF SITUATION IN PORTUGAL; PROBLEM WITH CUNHAL IS COMPOUNDED BY FACT HE APPARENTLY BELIEVES ITALIAN CP LEADER TOGLIATTI MISSED HIS CHANCE IN 1946; SOARES WAS LESS CONCERNED ABOUT CARVALHO. SOARES URGED THAT POLITICALLY NAIVE OFFICERS OF PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (.*-) BE INVITED TO SEE SITUATION IN ADVANCED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, NOTABLY SCANDINAVIA. MOST IMPORTANT ACTION OF MEETING, SAID STEEN, WAS CREATION OF HIGH-LEVEL INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT COMMITTEE, SUGGESTED BY BRANDT AND TO BE ORGANIZED BY PALME. COMMITTEE WOULD BE PRIMARILY A SYMBOL AND SOURCE OF MORAL PRESSURE, RATHER THAN ORGANIZER OF PRACTICAL OR FINANCIAL HELP FOR THE SOCIALIST. SOARES EXPLAINED CONFIDENTIALLY TO STEEN THAT HE WAS IN A DELICATE POSITION REGARDING FOREIGN AID. AS A PATRIOT, HE COULD HARDLY ADVOCATE ANYTHING OTHER THAN MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE. HOWEVER, HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE COMMON MARKET GESTURE IN CUTTING OFF AID PENDING SOME EVIDENCE OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS HELPED AND DID NOT BOTHER HIM, DESPITE FACT HE WAS UNABLE TO ADVOCATE OR SUPPORT SUCH ACTION. NORWAY WOULD CONTINUE GOING FORWARD WITH ITS AID PROJECTS FOR THE MOMENT, SINCE SITUATION WAS UNCLEAR AND THERE WAS STILL HOPE FOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS. BUT NORWEGIANS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT AID A COMMUNIST OR MILITARY-COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP IN PORTUGAL. END SUMMARY

1. NORWEGIAN LABOR PARTY CHAIRMAN REIULF STEEN RECEIVED ME AUGUST 11 AT MY REQUEST TO DISCUSS STOCKHOLM SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC MEETING, WHICH STEEN ATTENDED FOR NORWAY ALONG WITH PRIME MINISTER TRYGVE BRATTELL. STEEN, TAKING TIME OUT FROM PREPARATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER NATIONWIDE MUNICIPAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS, SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT MEETING, CONFIDENTIAL

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SITUATION IN PORTUGAL AND NORWAY'S INTEREST. SOARES DEPICTED SITUATION AS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, BUT HE DID NOT SEE SITUATION AS DARK AS PORTRAYED IN PRESS AND WAS CLEARLY NOT GIVING UP HOPE FOR AMODERATE SOLUTION. INDEED, SOARES STRESSED NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. STEEN HAD TWO HOUR PRIVATE TALK WITH SOARES IN STOCKHOLM BEFORE OTHERS ARRIVED FROM HELSINKI AND FOUND SOARES ONLY

SLIGHTLY MORE PESSIMISTIC IN PRIVATE, AGAIN LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN STEEN EXPECTED. STEEN WAS RETICENT ABOUT HIS PRIVATE TALK WITH SOARES.

2. SOARES SAID MFA HAD CONDUCTED PRIVATE OPINION POLL WHICH SHOWED SOCIALISTS WITH 51 PERCENT SUPPORT AND COMMUNIST WITH ONLY 7 PERCENT. ON OTHER HAND, COMMUNISTS' DOGMATIC ATTITUDE AND UNDEMOCRATIC TACTICS (CONTROL OF MEDIA, STRANGLEHOLD ON UNION LEADERSHIP, ETC.) WERE ALARMING. SOARES SAID OPINION WAS SWINGING SHARPLY TO NEED TO FRUSTRATE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER, AND THAT THIS WAS EVIDENCED BY RECENT DEMONSTRATION. SOARES SAID SUPPORTERS WERE PLEADING TO SOCIALIST PARTY FOR ARMS, WHICH, OF COURSE, SOCIALISTS DID NOT HAVE AND WOULD NOT PROVIDE IF THEY DID. SOARES INSISTED REPEATEDLY ON NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. BASIS FOR SUCH A POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE RELINQUISHMENT OF AUTHORITY BY PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES AND FORCES SUPPORTING HIM. SOLUTION COULD BE COALITION OF PARTIES PROPORTIONATE TO THEIR POPULAR STRENGTH, PLUS MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

3. STEEN STRESSED THAT PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS WERE MORE DOGMATIC AND HARD LINE THAN EVEN SOVIETS THEMSELVES. COMMUNISTS HAD ACCESS TO UNLIMITED FUNDS AND KEPT ORGANIZATION INTACT UNDER SALAZAR AND CAETANO DICTATORSHIPS WHEN SOCIALISTS WERE IN EXILE. HE SAID HE HAD LEARNED IN YUGOSLAVIA THAT UGOSLAV, ROMANIAN, ITALIAN AND SPANISH (THE MOST MODERATE OF ALL, ACCORDING TO STEEN) COMMUNISTS ALL HAD PUT PRESSURE ON PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS TO MODERATE THEIR COURSE, BUT STEEN WAS UNCERTAIN HOW MUCH EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE. SOARES RECOUNTED THAT CUNHAL WAS CRITICAL OF LATE ITALIAN

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COMMUNIST LEADER TOGLIATTI FOR MISSING OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE POWER IN 1946. STEEN SAID SOVIETS DENIED THEY WERE FINANCIALLY SUPPORTING OR DIRECTING PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS WHEN SOVIETS WERE PRESSED ON SUBJECT.

4. STEEN SAID SOARES DEMONSTRATED NO WORRY ABOUT HIS PERSONAL SAFETY. STEEN SUGGESTED THAT MFA COULD NOT AFFORD TO TOUCH SOARES AND THAT RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY HAVE BEEN PLANNED TO MAKE IT SO. SOARES WAS NOT OVERLY WORRIED ABOUT CARVALHO, WHO WAS VERY NAIVE POLITICALLY, IMPRESSIONABLE AND GIVEN TO SPEAKING AND ACTING BEFORE HE THOUGHT. SOARES ATTACHED RELATIVELY LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE TO CARVALHO'S "BULL RING" STATEMENT, COMING, AS IT DID, IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM CUBA. JUST BACK FROM CUBA, CARVALHO ENVISIONED CUBAN SOLUTIONS

FOR PORTUGUESE PROBLEMS, WHEREAS HE WOULD ADVOCATE SCANDINAVIAN SOLUTIONS IF HE HAD JUST VISITED SCANDINAVIA, SOARES SAID. SOARES URGED SCANDINAVIANS AND OTHERS TO INVITE KEY BUT POLITICALLY NAIVE AND INEXPERIENCED MFA OFFICERS TO VISIT THEIR COUNTRIES AND LEARN HOW PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY WORKS.

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FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 092

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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5. SOARES WAS HAPPY TO GET DEMONSTRATIONS OF SUPPORT FROM FELLOW SOCIALIST PARTIES AND APPEALED FOR MORE FINANCIAL SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH CRITICAL OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT FOR PORTUGAL'S COMMUNITIES, SOARES WAS NOT

WORRIED ABOUT CRITICISM FOR RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM SOCIALISTS ABROAD. HE WAS WORRIED, HOWEVER, ABOUT SUPPORT HE WAS GETTING FROM RIGHT WING FORCES, ESPECIALLY FROM FORMER CAETANO AND SALAZAR SUPPORTERS IN PORTUGAL, WHICH WAS POLITICALLY EMBARRASSING AND PLAYED INTO HANDS OF COMMUNISTS AND HIS ENEMIES WITHIN MFA.
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6. STEEN SAID SOARES HAD REFERRED TO USG'S "RESIGNED" ROLE IN PORTUGAL. STEEN AVOIDED ANY PERSONAL EVALUATION OF U.S. ROLE AND SAID THAT SOARES HAD SIMPLY STATED IT AS A FACT WITHOUT VALUE JUDGMENT.

7. ASKED ABOUT FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR PORTUGAL'S SOCIALISTS AND THE NOT-VERY-SUCCESSFUL FUND RAISING DRIVE LAST YEAR BY THE NORWEGIAN LABOR PARTY AND LO (TRADE UNION FEDERATION, STEEN CONCEDED THAT THIS AND MOST OTHER INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL FUND RAISING DRIVES WERE RATHER UNSUCCESSFUL. HE SAID TIMING WAS BAD, FUND RAISING WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL NOW THAT SITUATION IS DIFFICULT IN PORTUGAL THAN LAST YEAR WHEN THINGS WENT WELL THERE. STEEN ADDED THAT REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS TO PORTUGAL'S SOCIALIST PARTY ARE BEING APPROVED BY THE JOINT LO-LABOR PARTY "INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FUND". SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES THROUGHOUT EUROPE ARE RELATIVELY POOR, HE SAID, AND CANNOT DRAW ON STATE FUNDS LIKE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, BUT SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNION MOVEMENTS HAVE MONEY TO PROVIDE, AS THROUGH NORWAY'S "INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FUND" HE OBSERVED APPROVINGLY THAT "INTERSINDICAL" IS NOW RECOGNIZED AS A COMMUNIST TOOL AND SUPPORT IS CONCENTRATED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE SOCIALIST PARTY. EARLIER ADVICE TO PORTUGAL'S SOCIALISTS TO SUPPORT A "UNITARY TRADE UNION MOVEMENT" HAS NOW BEEN DROPPED. HE WAS RATHER RETICENT ABOUT PROVIDING FURTHER DETAILS CONCERNING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PORTUGAL'S SOCIALISTS.

8. QUESTIONS TO STEEN ABOUT WHETHER CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR HELPING PORTUGAL'S SOCIALISTS SHOULD THEY BE FORCED INTO OPPOSITION OR UNDERGROUND HAD BEEN CONSIDERED RECEIVED ONLY EVASIVE REPLIES AND REFERENCES TO SOARES' INSISTENCE ON NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE SAME WAS TRUE OF QUESTION OF POSSIBLE DEGENERATION OF SITUATION INTO CIVIL CONFLICT. ASKED ABOUT BALANCE OF FORCES WITHIN MFA, STEEN SAID NAVY WAS CLEARLY PRO-COMMUNIST, AIR FORCE STRONGLY SUPPORTED MODERATES, BUT SITUATION IN ARMY WAS UNCLEAR. HE RETOLD STORY ABOUT AIR FORCE MOBILIZATION TO BOMB A REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETING (OSLO 2776, PARA 3), BUT SAID
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IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO CONSIDERATION OF ARRESTING MOD-
ERATE MILITARY OFFICERS. (IN OSLO 2776, LO INTERNATIONAL
SECRETARY SANDEGREN SAID IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO
CONSIDERATION OF ARRESTING SOARES.)

9. STEEN STRESSED THAT KEY DECISION OF STOCKHOLM MEETING
WAS TO FORM A HIGH LEVEL EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT
COMMITTEE FOR PORTUGAL'S SOCIALISTS. WEST GERMAN SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHAIRMAN WILLY BRANDT PROPOSED IT,
ACCORDING TO STEEN, AND SWEDEN'S PRIME MINISTER OLOF
PALME WAS CHARGED WITH ORGANIZING IT. STEEN ENVISIONED
COMMITTEE WITH BRANDT, PALME AND BRITISH PRIME MINISTER WILSON AS
MEMBERS PROVIDING PRESTIGIOUS MORAL
SUPPORT AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE THROUGH SUCH ACTION AS A
SUDDEN TRIP TO PORTUGAL AT A KEY MOMENT TO COUNSEL
MFA AGAINST RASH MOVES. STEEN SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
FOR PORTUGUESE MILITARY LEADERS TO TURN DOWN SUCH A VISIT.
HE THOUGHT DAY-TO-DY FINANCIAL AND OTHER SUPPORT WOULD
BE HANDLED AT A LOWER LEVEL, ALTHOUGH COMMITTEE
COULD CONCEIVABLY RECEIVE AND ACT UPON A REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL
SUPPORT. STEEN SAID HE AND OTHER NORWEGIAN SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS WERE NOW BUSY PREPARING FOR ELECTION CAMPAIGN
HERE, BUT THAT SWEDES WERE EXTREMELY COMPETENT ORGANIZERS
AND HE WAS CONFIDENT PALME WOULD FORM COMMITTEE QUICKLY.
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